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behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general (possibly 
non-convex) individual preferences. We establish a Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(CARP), which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with 
collective rationality. Our main result takes the form of a ‘collective’ version of the Afriat 
Theorem for rational behavior in terms of the unitary model. This theorem has some 
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externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. 
The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or 
publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing 
convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the 
model that assumes all household consumption is public. 
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The collective model has become increasingly popular to analyze household
consumption behavior. Chiappori (1988, 1992) introduced this model as a
valuable alternative for the standard unitary model, which describes house-
hold behavior as if the household were a single decision maker, who maximizes
￿ household￿preferences subject to the household budget constraint. The col-
lective model explicitly recognizes that the household consists of multiple
decision makers (household members) with own rational preferences. It only
assumes that the observed household consumption decisions are Pareto e¢ -
cient outcomes of an intra-household allocation process.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) suggested a most general collective con-
sumption model, which accounts for externalities and public consumption
within the household. In addition, they make the minimalistic assumption
that the empirical analyst does not observe which consumption quantities
are privately consumed (possibly characterized by externalities) and which
quantities are publicly consumed. Focusing on a parametric characterization
of this general model, they establish that for two-person households collec-
tively rational household behavior requires a pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can
be written as the sum of a symmetric negative semi-de￿nite matrix and a
rank one matrix. Browning and Chiappori show necessity of this condition;
Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) address the associated su¢ ciency question.
For this general collective consumption model, Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2007) recently presented a nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿
characterization in the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982).1 They
established a necessary nonparametric condition and a complementary su¢ -
cient nonparametric condition that allow for testing whether a ￿nite number
of observations can be rationalized in terms of the collective model. They
argue that, in general, the necessary condition and the su¢ cient condition do
not coincide. For deriving their results, these authors assume concave util-
ity functions (representing convex preferences) of the individual household
members; this implies a convex utility possibility set and a corresponding
characterization of Pareto e¢ cient intra-household allocations. In addition,
they exclude negative externalities. Note that a similar convexity assump-
tion is made by Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland
1See also Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contri-
butions on the revealed preference approach to analyzing consumption behavior.
3(2006) in their parametric setting.
We complete the results of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007).
More speci￿cally, we address the same questions but we drop the prior as-
sumptions that members￿preferences are convex and that there are no neg-
ative externalities. Relaxing convexity implies that the household utility
possibility set can be non-convex (even if the budget set is linear). Indeed, it
has been argued that convexity assumptions are problematic in the presence
of (positive or negative) externalities; see for example Starr (1969), Starret
(1972) and, more recently, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). In ad-
dition, the fact that we do not impose convexity a priori is consistent with
the nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿approach for analyzing the unitary
model, which equally does not assume convex (in casu unitary ￿ household￿ )
preferences a priori but only maintains local non-satiation as a minimal as-
sumption (see, e.g., Varian, 1982). In our approach, we only maintain a local
collective non-satiation assumption which, as we will argue, provides a nat-
ural ￿ collective￿version of the non-satiation assumption that is used in the
context of the unitary model.
Our main result is that we derive a nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿
condition in terms of the observed aggregate quantity and price data that is
both necessary and su¢ cient for household behavior to be consistent with
Pareto e¢ ciency under general preferences of the household members. Specif-
ically, we show that the condition which Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007) identi￿ed as necessary (but not su¢ cient) for a collective rationaliza-
tion of the data under convex individual preferences, becomes both necessary
and su¢ cient when dropping the convex preferences assumption. The con-
dition has a formally similar structure as the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) that provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
consistency of observed household behavior with the unitary model (see Var-
ian, 1982); and, therefore, we call it the Collective Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ence (CARP). This characterization of collectively rational behavior in terms
of data consistency with CARP takes the form of a ￿ collective￿version of the
well-known Afriat Theorem for the unitary model.
Apart from the general collective consumption model, we also consider
two special cases of this general model: (i) the model that excludes public
consumption and externalities (also known as the ￿ egoistic￿model); and (ii)
the model that excludes private consumption (and, thus, in which all con-
4sumption is public).2 Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) use the same distinction
between a general case and special cases to structure their parametric results
on empirical characterizations of collective consumption models. Moreover,
the special cases are mostly considered in empirical applications of the collec-
tive model. Interestingly, we ￿nd that data consistency with CARP is also
necessary and su¢ cient for a data rationalization in terms of these special
cases. This implies that assumptions regarding privateness or publicness of
consumption are non-testable under the abovementioned assumptions. In
fact, as we will discuss, our results yield some additional testability conclu-
sions regarding properties (concavity and monotonicity) of the data rational-
izing utility functions. We will contrast these results with existing ￿ndings
on the (non)parametric characterization of collective consumption models
under convex preferences, and on the nonparametric characterization of the
unitary model.
From a practical point of view, because CARP only includes observable
price and quantity information, our results directly imply a necessary and
su¢ cient ￿ revealed preference￿condition for collective rationality that can
be tested on a ￿nite number of observations. Because of our minimal prior
assumptions, this CARP test can be conceived as a ￿ pure test￿of Pareto
e¢ cient collective consumption behavior. Interestingly, this test applies to
a general number of observations and has direct practical applicability. It
follows from Proposition 3 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) that
collectively rational behavior (summarized in terms of CARP) can be re-
jected if and only if there are at least three observations and three goods.
Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2008) present an integer pro-
gramming version of the test, including a MATLAB code and an empirical
application to real-life data.
At this point, it is worth indicating that our results can also be instru-
mental in alternative contexts. For example, they readily extend to the
general case of multi-person group consumption. See Chiappori and Ekeland
2The ￿ egoistic￿model actually encompasses a wider class of member-speci￿c utilities,
which model altruism in a speci￿c way: it also includes so-called caring preferences of the
individual household members, which depend not only on the member￿ s own (egoistic)
utility but also on the other member￿ s utility. Chiappori (1992) argues that, given Pareto
e¢ ciency, the empirical implications of caring preferences are indistinguishable from those
of egoistic preferences. As such, while we will not indicate this explicitly in the following
discussion, our conclusions for the egoistic model carry over to the (more general) caring
model.
5(2006, 2008) for discussion on the relevance of the collective model within
the context of group consumption. To ease our exposition, the theoretical
discussion in the following sections focuses on two-person households. Gen-
eralizations for M-member groups (M ￿ 2) can be obtained along the lines
of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007; supplemental material). Next,
the nonparametric approach to analyzing collective consumption behavior is
closely related to the literature on testable nonparametric restrictions of gen-
eral equilibrium models. See Brown and Matzkin (1996), Brown and Shannon
(2000) and, for a more recent survey, Carvajal, Ray and Snyder (2004). As
such, our insights can be useful to conceive nonparametric general equilib-
rium restrictions in the case of non-convex preferences. Lastly, our results for
the collective consumption model can also be relevant for nonparametric pro-
duction analysis. See Cherchye De Rock and Vermeulen (2008), who adopt
a formally similar collective model for analyzing economies of scope in the
context of multi-output production (in casu under convex output possibility
sets).
Before entering our analysis, two ￿nal remarks are in order. First, para-
metric applications of the collective model often use so-called ￿ assignable￿
quantity information, which means that the empirical analyst observes how
much a group member consumes of the corresponding goods; see, for ex-
ample, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) and Bour-
guignon, Browning and Chiappori (2008). Such information is often partly,
but not fully, available in practical applications (through budget surveys).
To keep our discussion focused, we will abstract from such assignable quan-
tity information in what follows. Still, it is worth emphasizing that including
such information in our following results is relatively easy; it can proceed
analogously as in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008), who focus on
nonparametric testing and recovery (or ￿ identi￿ability￿ ) of collective con-
sumption models under the maintained assumption of convex preferences,
while accounting for assignable quantity information.
The second introductory remark pertains to the precise interpretation of
our following testability conclusions regarding concave utility functions; see
in particular our discussion in Section 6. In this respect, it is worth to brie￿ y
recall the subtle relation between ￿ convex preferences￿and ￿ concave utility
functions￿ . Concave utility functions always imply a convex utility possibil-
ity set (when the budget set is linear). In other words, if we reject collective
rationality for a convex utility possibility set, then we also reject collec-
tive rationality for concave utility functions. Thus, testability of a convex
6utility possibility set relates unambiguously to testability of concave utility
functions. But it is also well-known that, under some mild technical condi-
tions, convex preferences can be represented by a concave utility function;
see Kannai (1977) and Richter and Wong (2004) for discussion. As such,
when assuming these mild conditions, our testability results regarding con-
cave utility functions directly extend to convex preferences. Given this, we
will sometimes refer to convex preferences instead of concave utility functions
in the following.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the
stage by brie￿ y recapturing the unitary GARP condition and the corre-
sponding Afriat Theorem. Section 3 de￿nes collective rationality. Section
4 provides the associated nonparametric CARP condition and the Collec-
tive Afriat Theorem. Section 5 focuses on two special cases of the collective
model. Section 6 relates our ￿ndings to existing results in the literature.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of our main
results.
2 Unitary rationality
We ￿rst recapture the nonparametric conditions for unitary rationality, as
they have been presented by Varian (1982). This will ease our following dis-
cussion, as it enables comparing our main results for the collective rationality
model with those for the unitary rationality model.
We consider a household that purchases the (non-zero) N-vector of quan-
tities q 2 RN
+ when confronted with the prices p 2 RN
++. Suppose T observa-
tions of the household consumption behavior. For each observation t, we use
pt and qt to denote the (observed) aggregate prices and quantities, respec-
tively; while S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg represents the set of observations.
We can then de￿ne the condition for a unitary rationalization of a set of ob-
servations S, which -to recall- models household behavior as if the household
were a single decision maker (i.e. the household maximizes a single utility
function).
De￿nition 1 (unitary rationalization) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg be
a set of observations. A utility function U provides a unitary rationalization




7The nonparametric condition for unitary rationality only assumes local
non-satiation of the utility function U. As argued by Varian (1982), local
non-satiation avoids trivial rationalizations of the data for the unitary model:
without this additional assumption, any observed household consumption
behavior can be rationalized in terms of this model.
De￿nition 2 (local non-satiation) A utility function U satis￿es local non-
satiation if the following holds. Suppose quantities qr. Then for any ￿ > 0
there exist quantities q with kq ￿ qrk < ￿ such that U (q) > U (qr):
Varian (1982) established that there exists a locally non-satiated utility
function that provides a unitary rationalization of the set of observations S
if and only if the data satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP).
De￿nition 3 (GARP) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of obser-
vations. The set S satis￿es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP) if there exist relations R0; R that meet:
(i) if p0
sqs ￿ p0
sqt then qs R0 qt;
(ii) if qs R0 qu; qu R0 qv; :::; qz R0 qt for some (possibly empty) sequence
(u; v; :::; z) then qs R qt;
(iii) if qs R qt then p0
tqt ￿ p0
tqs:
In words, the quantities qs are ￿ directly revealed preferred￿over the quan-
tities qt (i.e. qs R0 qt) if qs were chosen when qt were equally attainable (i.e.
p0
sqs ￿ p0
sqt); see rule (i). Next, the ￿ revealed preference￿relation R exploits
transitivity of preferences; see rule (ii). Finally, rule (iii) imposes that the
quantities qt cannot be more expensive than revealed preferred quantities qs.
The following Afriat Theorem (Varian, 1982; based on Afriat, 1967) gives
a nonparametric characterization of rational consumption behavior in terms
of the unitary model.
Theorem 1 (Afriat Theorem) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of
observations. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a utility function U that satis￿es local non-satiation and that
provides a unitary rationalization of S;
(ii) The set S satis￿es GARP;
8(iii) For all t;r 2 f1;:::;Tg, there exist numbers Ut; ￿t 2 R++ that meet the
Afriat inequalities
Ur ￿ Ut ￿ ￿tp
0
t (qr ￿ qt);
(iv) There exists a continuous, monotonically increasing and concave util-
ity function U that satis￿es local non-satiation and that provides a unitary
rationalization of S.
In this result, condition (ii) implies that data consistency with GARP is
necessary and su¢ cient for a unitary rationalization of the data. Condition
(iii) provides an equivalent characterization in terms of the Afriat inequali-
ties, which allow an explicit construction of the utility levels associated with
each observation t (i.e. utility level Ut for observed quantities qt). Finally,
condition (iv) states that, if there exists a utility function that provides a
unitary rationalization of the set S, then there exists a continuous, monotone
and concave utility function that provides such a rationalization. This also
implies that continuity, monotonicity and concavity of the data rationalizing
utility function is non-testable for the unitary model; i.e., violations of con-
tinuity, monotonicity or concavity cannot be detected with a ￿nite number
of observations.
3 Collective rationality
We consider a two-member (1 and 2) household. Like before, the household
purchases the (non-zero) N-vector of quantities q 2 RN
+ with corresponding
prices p 2 RN
++. All goods can be consumed privately, publicly or both.
Generally, we have q = q1+q2+qh for q the (observed) aggregate quantities,
q1 and q2 the (unobserved) private quantities of each household member, and
qh the (unobserved) public quantities.
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we consider general prefer-
ences for the household members that may depend not only on the own
private and public quantities, but also on the other individual￿ s private quan-
tities; this allows for (positive or negative) externalities. Formally, this means
that the preferences of each household member m (m = 1;2) can be repre-
sented by a utility function of the form Um that is de￿ned in the arguments
q1, q2 and qh.
















9Each b q captures a feasible decomposition of the aggregate quantities q into
private quantities (q1 and q2) and public quantities (qh): This re￿ ects that
the general model allows for both private and public consumption; for the
two special cases mentioned in the introduction, some of these components
of b q are zero by construction (see also Section 5). In the following, we
consider feasible personalized quantities because we assume that the ￿ true￿
personalized quantities are not observed. Throughout, we will use that each
b q de￿nes a unique q.
Given this, a collective rationalization of S requires the existence of utility
functions U1 and U2 such that each observed consumption bundle can be
characterized as Pareto e¢ cient.
De￿nition 4 (collective rationalization) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg
be a set of observations. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a
collective rationalization of S if for each observation t there exist feasible
personalized quantities b qt such that Um (b qr) > Um (b qt) implies Ul (b qr) <
Ul (b qt) (m 6= l) for all feasible personalized quantities b qr with p0
tqr ￿ p0
tqt.
Just like the nonparametric condition for unitary rationality assumes local
non-satiation, we will assume local collective non-satiation of the individual
utility functions U1 and U2. Because it has a formally similar structure, this
local collective non-satiation concept can be interpreted as the ￿ collective￿
analogue of the local non-satiation concept in De￿nition 2. In what follows,
we will only use local collective non-satiation as a maintained assumption.
As such, and in contrast with Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007),
we do not maintain concavity and (positive) monotonicity of the individual
utility functions. Inter alia, this implies that we do not a priori exclude
negative consumption externalities.
De￿nition 5 (local collective non-satiation) A pair of utility functions
U1 and U2 satis￿es local collective non-satiation if the following holds. Sup-
pose feasible personalized quantities b qr1 and b qr2, and let r = fr1g [ fr2g.
Then for any ￿ ￿ 0 there exist quantities q with
￿ ￿P
r2r qr ￿ q
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ such
that U1 (b q) ￿ U1 (b qr1) and U2 (b q) ￿ U2 (b qr2), with at least one strict in-
equality if ￿ > 0, for feasible personalized quantities b q:
In words, suppose an initial situation in which member 1 evaluates feasible
personalized quantities b qr1 (corresponding to qr1) and member 2 evaluates
10feasible personalized quantities b qr2 (corresponding to qr2). Then for ￿ >
0 and q close to the ￿ summed quantities￿
P
r2r qr there exist personalized
quantities b q that entail a Pareto improvement as compared to this initial
situation.3 As for the speci￿cation of
P
r2r qr, we need to consider two cases.
In the ￿rst case, r1 = r2 and thus
P
r2r qr = qr1 = qr2. This pertains to an
initial situation in which both household members evaluate the same feasible
personalized quantities b qr1 = b qr2; and local collective non-satiation implies
that a Pareto improvement is possible for (aggregate) quantities q close to
qr1 = qr2. In the second case, r2 6= r1 and thus
P
r2r qr = qr1 + qr2. This
pertains to an initial situation in which both household members evaluate
di⁄erent feasible personalized quantities b qr1 and b qr2; and local collective
non-satiation implies that a Pareto improvement is possible for (aggregate)
quantities q close to the sum qr1 + qr2.
This assumption of local collective non-satiation avoids trivial collective
rationalizations of a set of observations S: without this assumption, any
observed household consumption behavior can be rationalized in terms of
the collective consumption model (i.e. any set S of quantity choices q under
alternative prices p can be characterized as Pareto e¢ cient intra-household
allocations).4 As such, this maintained assumption plays exactly the same
role for the collective model as the standard local non-satiation assumption
for the unitary model.
To conclude this section, we introduce an equivalent characterization of
Pareto e¢ ciency in De￿nition 4, which will be useful for our following dis-
cussion:
Lemma 1 Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. A pair of
utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collective rationalization of S if and
3As compared to De￿nition 2, we also consider ￿ = 0 in De￿nition 5. The condition
for ￿ = 0 is a technical one, which is only required in a limiting case, i.e. r = ft1; t2g and
p0
sqs = p0
s(qt1 + qt2), to obtain rule (iii) in De￿nition 6 (Collective Axiom of Revealed
Preference; CARP) as a necessary condition for a collective rationalization of a set of
observations S: See Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.
4More speci￿cally, local collective non-satiation in De￿nition 5 is crucial to obtain rules
(iii) (for r = ft1;t2g with t1 6= t2 ) and (iv) in De￿nition 6 (CARP) as necessary conditions
for a collective rationalization of a set of observations S; see Step 1 in the proof of Theorem
2: Without these rules, any set S trivially satis￿es the remaining rules in the de￿nition of
CARP. For example, it can be veri￿ed that, in this case, consistency of any set S with
CARP is achieved for a transitive speci￿cation of the relations H1; H2 which satis￿es,
for all qs and qt, that qsH1qt implies qtH2qs.
11only if for each observation t there exist feasible personalized quantities b qt
such that, for all b qr with p0
tqr ￿ p0
tqt, there exist ￿1
tr and ￿2





1 (b qt) + ￿
2
trU
2 (b qt) ￿ ￿
1
trU




This alternative characterization of collective rationality (or Pareto ef-
￿ciency) will return in the collective Afriat inequalities that we introduce
below (Theorem 2). Essentially, it requires that for observation t to corre-
spond to a Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold allocation there must exist b qt such
that, for any b qr that was equally attainable under the given prices (i.e. with
p0
tqr ￿ p0
tqt), we can de￿ne strictly positive weights ￿1
tr and ￿2
tr for which
the corresponding weighted sum of utilities for b qt exceeds the one for b qr (i.• e.
￿1
trU1 (b qt) + ￿2
trU2 (b qt) ￿ ￿1
trU1 (b qr) + ￿2
trU2 (b qr)). We note that, for each t,
the weights ￿1
tr and ￿2
tr depend on the identity of b qr. This follows from the
fact we do not assume concave utility functions for the individual members,
which -to recall- implies that we may have a non-convex utility possibility set
(even if the budget set is linear). If we would have assumed a convex utility
possibility set (e.g. because of concave individual utility functions represent-
ing convex preferences), then we could specify ￿m
tr = ￿m
t (m = 1;2) for all
b qr; this case is usually considered in the literature on collective consumption
models.
We illustrate by Figure 1, which presents a non-convex utility possibility
set corresponding to some given budget. In that ￿gure, b qs (corresponding
to point 1 in Figure 1) is Pareto ine¢ cient: the intersection of the utility
possibility set with the light shaded area is non-empty. For example, b qt
(point 2) implies a Pareto improvement over b qs, because U1 (b qt) > U1 (b qs)
and U2 (b qt) > U2 (b qs). In terms of the characterization in Lemma 1, we have
￿1
stU1 (b qs)+ ￿2
stU2 (b qs) < ￿1
stU1 (b qt)+ ￿2
stU2 (b qt) for each possible speci￿ca-
tion of ￿1
st and ￿2
st: By contrast, b qt is Pareto e¢ cient: the intersection of the
utility possibility set with the dark shaded area is empty. Correspondingly,
b qt is consistent with the Pareto e¢ ciency characterization in Lemma 1.
The ￿gure also allows us to illustrate the di⁄erence between the char-
acterization of Pareto e¢ ciency for non-convex utility possibility sets with
the one for convex utility possibility sets: for the given (non-convex) utility
possibility set, b qt is Pareto e¢ cient when compared to the member-speci￿c
utilities that correspond to points 3 and 4, while there exist convex combi-
nations of these member-speci￿c utilities that imply a Pareto improvement
over b qt. This di⁄erence pertains to the fact that in Lemma 1, for each t, the
12( )
1 ˆ qt U 1 U
2 U
( )
2 ˆ qs U
( )
2 ˆ qt U
( )





Figure 1: Pareto e¢ ciency
Pareto weights ￿1
tr and ￿2
tr can vary with the identity of r.
4 Nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿char-
acterization
We ￿rst present the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP), which
we can interpret as a natural ￿ collective￿extension of the unitary GARP
condition. CARP imposes empirical restrictions on hypothetical preference
relations Hm
0 and Hm, which capture ￿ feasible￿speci￿cations of the individ-
ual preference relations given the information that is revealed by the set of
observations S: qs Hm qt (qs Hm
0 qt) means that we ￿ hypothesize￿that mem-
ber m (directly) prefers the quantities qs over the quantities qt. Note that,
while the ￿ true￿preferences are expressed in terms of the feasible personalized
quantities b q (i.e. member m prefers qs over qt only if Um(b qs) ￿ Um(b qt)),
the hypothetical preferences only use observable information (captured by
the observed aggregate prices p and quantities q in the set S). This nat-
13urally complies with the assumption that in the general model we have no
information concerning the feasible personalized quantities.
De￿nition 6 (CARP) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of obser-
vations. The set S satis￿es the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference
(CARP) if there exist hypothetical relations Hm
0 ; Hm for each member
m 2 f1;2g that meet:
(i) if p0
sqs ￿ p0
sqt then qs H1
0 qt or qs H2
0 qt;
(ii) if qs Hm
0 qu; qu Hm
0 qv; :::; qz Hm
0 qt for some (possibly empty) sequence
(u; v; :::; z) then qs Hm qt;




r2r qr and qt1 Hm qs then qs Hl
0 qt2
(with m 6= l);




r2r qr for r = fs1g [ fs2g:
This CARP axiom has a direct interpretation in terms of the Pareto
e¢ ciency requirement that underlies collective rationality. Rule (i) states
that, if the quantities qs were chosen while the quantities qt were equally
attainable (under the prices ps), then it must be that at least one member
prefers the quantities qs over the quantities qt (i.e. qs H1
0 qt or qs H2
0 qt):
Rule (ii) captures transitivity. As for rule (iii), we note that the ￿ summed
quantities￿
P
r2r qr = qt1 + qt2 if t1 6= t2 and
P
r2r qr = qt if t1 = t2 = t.
Given this, rule (iii) can again be interpreted in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency.
Speci￿cally, it states that, if member m prefers qt1 over qs for the bundle P
r2r qr not more expensive than qs, then the choice of qs can be rationalized
only if the other member l prefers qs over qt2. Indeed, if this last condition
were not satis￿ed, then the bundle
P
r2r qr (under the given prices ps and
outlay p0
sqs) would imply a Pareto improvement over the chosen bundle qs.
Rule (iv), ￿nally, complements rule (iii). It states that, if member m prefers
qsm over qt, then the choice of qt can be rationalized only if it is not more
expensive than the (newly de￿ned) ￿ summed quantities￿
P
r2r qr. Indeed,
if this last condition were not met, then for the given prices pt and outlay
p0
tqt both members would be better o⁄ by buying the quantities
P
r2r qr
rather than the chosen quantities qt, which of course con￿ icts with collective
rationality.
At this point, it is interesting to note that the CARP axiom has an
analogous structure as the GARP axiom that applies to the unitary model.
Speci￿cally, GARP states (in casu unitary) rationality conditions in terms of
14the preference information that is revealed by the observed price and quan-
tity data. Essentially, CARP does the same, but now the revealed preference
information is understood in terms of the collective model of household con-
sumption and, thus, pertains to the individual household members.5
We also recall that GARP provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
rational consumption behavior in the context of the unitary model. The next
theorem, which contains our core result, shows that CARP equally provides
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for collectively rational consumption be-
havior. It provides a ￿ collective￿version of the Afriat Theorem for unitary
rationality.
Theorem 2 (Collective Afriat Theorem) Let S = f(pt;qt);t = 1;:::;Tg
be a set of observations. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that satisfy local col-
lective non-satiation and that provide a collective rationalization of S;
(ii) The set S satis￿es CARP;






































(iv) There exists a pair of continuous and monotonically increasing utility
functions U1 and U2 that satisfy local collective non-satiation and that pro-
vide a collective rationalization of S.
This result implies that data consistency with CARP is necessary and
su¢ cient for a collective rationalization of the data; see condition (ii). In
turn, this institutes a test for collective rationality that can be tested on
the basis of observable price and quantity information. Next, condition (iii)
provides an equivalent characterization in terms of collective Afriat inequal-
ities; this complies with the Pareto e¢ ciency characterization in Lemma 1
(using ￿ summed quantities￿
P
r2r qr). Finally, condition (iv) implies that, as
5In this respect, we can also refer to the discussion in Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen
(2007, supplemental material). When presenting the generalized version of CARP for
M-member households, the authors argue that CARP concides with GARP when M = 1
(i.e. the household consists of a single decision maker/household member).
15soon as there exists a pair of utility functions that provide a rationalization,
there exist continuous and monotone utility functions that provide a ratio-
nalization; in the current context, monotonicity means that b qr1 ￿ b qr2 and
b qr1 6= b qr2 implies U1 (b qr1) ￿ U1 (b qr2) and U2 (b qr1) ￿ U2 (b qr2) with at least
one strict inequality. Inter alia, this implies that for the general collective
consumption model continuity and monotonicity are non-testable for a ￿nite
number of observations. Because a violation of monotonicity cannot be de-
tected with a ￿nite number of observations, we also conclude that the nature
(positive or negative) of the consumption externalities is non-testable for the
general consumption model. Section 6, which relates our ￿ndings to existing
results in the literature, will discuss additional interesting implications of the
Collective Afriat Theorem. For example, it will turn out that concavity of
the individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) is testable
for the collective consumption model.
5 Special cases
In this section we discuss two special cases of the collective model: (i) the
model with all consumption private and no externalities, which is also known
as the ￿ egoistic￿model, and (ii) the model in which all consumption is public.
The next result states that, as soon as there exists a rationalization of the
data in terms of the general collective consumption model, we can provide a
rationalization of the same data in terms of the egoistic model.
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2
that satisfy local collective non-satiation and that provide a collective ra-
tionalization of S. Then, for q = q1 + q2, there exists a pair of contin-
uous and monotonically increasing utility functions U1 (b q) = V 1 (q1) and
U2 (b q) = V 2 (q2), which exclude consumption externalities and public con-
sumption, that satisfy local collective non-satiation and that provide a col-
lective rationalization of S.
We conclude that CARP consistency is also necessary and su¢ cient for a
data rationalization in terms of the egoistic model, and that monotonicity is
non-testable for this model. In addition, just like for the general model (see
also our discussion in the next section), we also obtain for this special model
that concavity of the individual utility functions is testable.
16It is interesting to compare the result in Proposition 1 with the following
result, which pertains to the model with all consumption public.
Proposition 2 Suppose there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2
that satisfy local collective non-satiation and that provide a collective ratio-
nalization of S. Then, for q = qh, there exists a pair of continuous utility
functions U1 (b q) = W 1 ￿
qh￿
and U2 (b q) = W 2 ￿
qh￿
, which exclude private
consumption, that satisfy local collective non-satiation and that provide a
collective rationalization of S.
Thus, we again obtain that CARP provides a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for data consistency with this special collective consumption model.
The fact that CARP characterizes the general model as well as the two special
models provides the general conclusion that, for the given setting that allows
for possibly non-convex preferences, publicness or privateness of consumption
does not yield testable implications; we will discuss this more elaborately in
the next section. In addition, and analogous to before, we can conclude that
concavity is testable for this special case with all consumption public. Still,
contrary to before, it turns out that also monotonicity is testable for this
special model. In other words, we may need utility functions with negative
marginal utilities of the publicly consumed quantities to obtain a collective
rationalization.
Example 1 in the Appendix illustrates the result on monotonicity: it
presents data that require non-monotone individual utility functions for a
rationalization in terms of the special model with all consumption public.
In fact, the construction of the example also suggests an empirical test for
the monotonicity property in this special case of the collective model. More
speci￿cally, there exist a pair of monotone utility functions W 1 and W 2 that
provide a collective rationalization of the data (with only public consump-
tion) if and only if the data satisfy CARP and, in addition to rules (i) to (iv)
in De￿nition 6, the rule
(v) if qs ￿ qt and qs 6= qt then not qtH
1qs and not qtH
2qs.
Intuitively, we have qs = qh
s and qt = qh
t when all consumption is public,
which means that all personalized quantity information is observed. And,
thus, monotonicity excludes that any of the members prefers qt over qs when
qs ￿ qt and qs 6= qt; this is captured by rule (v). We conclude that, if there
do not exist relations Hm
0 and Hm (m = 1;2) that satisfy rules (i) to (iv) in
17De￿nition 6 and the above rule (v), then no monotonically increasing utility
functions exist with only publicly consumed quantities as arguments.
6 Relation to existing results
Our results developed in the previous sections bear interesting relations with
existing results. We can relate our nonparametric ￿ndings for the collective
model to those on the (non)parametric characterization of collective con-
sumption models under convex preferences. In addition, we can contrast
our ￿ndings with those on the nonparametric characterization of the unitary
model.
First, we can establish a relationship between our results and Chiappori
and Ekeland￿ s (2006) ￿ndings on the parametric characterization of collective
consumption models while maintaining the assumption of convex preferences.
As already indicated, we ￿nd that the same CARP condition is (necessary
and su¢ cient) for data consistency with the general collective model as well
as with the two special cases de￿ned above. This parallels the conclusion of
Chiappori and Ekeland that ￿ locally￿(i.e. in a su¢ ciently small neighborhood
of a given point) ￿an assumption like privateness (or publicness) of individ-
ual consumptions is not testable from data on group behavior￿(Chiappori
and Ekeland, 2006, p.4). In other words, Chiappori and Ekeland￿ s ￿ local￿
parametric result for convex preferences complies with our, by construction
￿ global￿ , nonparametric result when dropping the assumption of convex pref-
erences. For completeness, we must add that the conclusion changes when
requiring monotonicity of the data rationalizing utility functions: it follows
from our results in the previous section that monotonicity is testable for
the model with all consumption public, while it is non-testable for the other
models under consideration (i.e. the general model and the model with all
consumption private and no externalities).
It is also interesting to relate these conclusions to those of Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2008), who maintain the assumption of convex
preferences, and who do obtain di⁄erent nonparametric data consistency
conditions for the di⁄erent (i.e. general and special) collective consumption
models. Notably, this ￿nding of di⁄erent ￿ global￿(nonparametric) character-
izations for di⁄erent models contrasts with Chiappori and Ekeland￿ s ￿ local￿
(parametric) conclusion cited above (-to recall- under the same convexity as-
sumption). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen interpret that these diverging
18￿ndings con￿rm Chiappori and Ekeland￿ s ￿ strong suspicion￿that their local
results must not hold globally. Following this interpretation, the results in
the current paper add that Chiappori and Ekeland￿ s conclusion does hold
globally if convexity of the individual preferences is no longer maintained as
an assumption.
Next, we can compare our results with those on the nonparametric char-
acterization of the unitary consumption model (summarized by Varian, 1982
and 2006). In this respect, we ￿rst recall that the nonparametric character-
ization for the unitary model implies that monotonicity and concavity of a
data rationalizing household utility function is not testable in the standard
case with a linear budget set and positive prices.6 More speci￿cally, it is
well-known that, if there exists a household utility function that rationalizes
the data in terms of the unitary model (because the data are consistent with
GARP), then there always exists a monotone and concave household utility
function that provides such a rationalization. See also Theorem 1 above.
In contrast to this conclusion for the unitary model, we ￿nd for the col-
lective model that concavity of the individual household members￿utility
functions (or, convexity of the individual preferences) is testable. In partic-
ular, there may exist utility functions for the individual household members
that rationalize the data in terms of the collective model (because the data
are consistent with CARP), while there do not exist concave individual utility
functions that provide such a rationalization. This conclusion follows from
contrasting the CARP condition, which characterizes the collective model
when convex preferences are not imposed, with the condition in Proposi-
tion 1 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007), which characterizes the
collective model when convex preferences (implying a convex utility possi-
bility set) are imposed. In general, the two conditions do not coincide. For
instance, Example 2 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) provides
data that pass CARP (which -to recall- these authors present as a necessary
condition) but reject collective rationality under concave utility functions;
these data can be rationalized in the collective consumption model, but not
with concave individual utility functions.
Finally, as for monotonicity of the data rationalizing individual utility
6In the case of non-linear budget sets, Forges and Minelli (2006) argue that concavity is
testable for the unitary model. Given our following argument, this a fortiori also holds for
the collective model. In fact, our insights on testing data consistency with the collective
model for linear budget sets could serve as a useful basis when considering non-linear
budget sets in a collective setting.
19functions, we conclude that testability of monotonicity depends on the spe-
ci￿c collective model under consideration. For the general model and the
special model with all consumption private and no externalities (i.e. the ego-
istic model), we have demonstrated that monotonicity is non-testable when
the data satisfy CARP: if there exist individual utility functions that ratio-
nalize the data in terms of these collective models, then there always exist
monotone utility functions that provide such a rationalization. This implies
that negative marginal utilities (including negative externalities) cannot be
detected for these models. By contrast, we ￿nd that monotonicity of the
individual utility functions can be rejected for the special model with no
private consumption (i.e. all consumption is public). We conclude that, in
this case, it is possible to detect negative marginal utilities of the publicly
consumed goods. The intuition of the diverging results for the two special
cases is the following. In the egoistic model, negative marginal utilities are
pretty useless in the absence of externalities: individual rationality implies
that goods with a negative impact on own utility are simply not chosen by
the individual household member. This is not the case when all consumption
is public. In that case, it cannot be ruled out that a certain public good has
a positive impact on the utility of only one of the members, while it a⁄ects
the other member negatively.
7 Summary and conclusions
We have presented a nonparametric ￿ revealed preference￿characterization of
the general model of collectively rational (i.e. Pareto e¢ cient) household
consumption behavior, which accounts for (positive or negative) externali-
ties and public consumption in the household. Our distinguishing feature is
that we allow for non-convex individual preferences. Given this, we have de-
rived a necessary and su¢ cient condition for collective rationality. Because
this condition provides a natural extension of Varian￿ s Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference (GARP) for individually rational consumption behav-
ior, we have called it the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP).
Our main result provides a collective version of the Afriat Theorem for uni-
tary rational behavior. We also obtain that, when accounting for possibly
non-convex individual preferences, CARP characterizes not only the general
model but also special cases of this general model (i.e. the case with all
consumption private and no externalities, and the case with all consumption
20public).
In turn, our results provide some interesting testability conclusions, which
bear relation to existing results on the (non)parametric characterization of
collective consumption models under convex preferences, and on the non-
parametric characterization of the unitary model. We ￿nd that, with only
a ￿nite set of observations, privateness (with or without externalities) or
publicness of consumption is non-testable. For the general model and the
special (egoistic) model with all consumption private and no externalities,
the same non-testability conclusion holds for monotonicity of the individual
utility functions; this also implies that, in the general model, the nature (pos-
itive or negative) of the consumption externalities cannot be tested. Still,
monotonicity turns out to be testable for the special model with all con-
sumption public. In addition, concavity of the individual utility functions
(representing convex preferences) is testable for all collective consumption
models under consideration.
Finally, our results suggest operational tests of collective rationality, and
of concavity and monotonicity of the individual utility functions. More specif-
ically, such tests can use the integer programming (IP) formulations in Cher-
chye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008): these authors provide an IP test of
the CARP condition, which -to recall- applies to collective rationality un-
der possibly non-concave utility functions, as well as IP tests for collective
rationality under concave utility functions. Comparison of the di⁄erent test
results allows us to conclude whether or not concave utility functions (repre-
senting convex preferences) rationalize the observed collective consumption
behavior. An analogous IP formulation applies to the monotonicity test for
the special model with all consumption public (suggested in Section 5). See
Cherchye, De Rock, Sabbe and Vermeulen (2008) on the practical implemen-
tation of the IP tests.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Necessity. Suppose the utility functions U1 and U2 provide a collective
rationalization of S. Because the result follows trivially if U1 (b qt) ￿ U1 (b qr)
and U2 (b qt) ￿ U2 (b qr), we focus on Um (b qt) > Um (b qr) and Ul (b qt) < Ul (b qr)
(m 6= l). Then there exists ￿1
tr; ￿2






Um(b qt)￿Um(b qr) > 0;
21which implies ￿1
trU1 (b qt) + ￿2
trU2 (b qt) ￿ ￿1
trU1 (b qr) + ￿2
trU2 (b qr):
Su¢ ciency. Suppose there exist utility functions U1 and U2 and ￿1
tr; ￿2
tr 2
R++ that imply, for each t, ￿1
trU1 (b qt)+￿2
trU2 (b qt) ￿ ￿1
trU1 (b qr)+￿2
trU2 (b qr)
for some feasible personalized quantities b qt and all b qr with p0
tqr ￿ p0
tqt.
We prove ad absurdum. Suppose the functions U1 and U2 do not provide
a collective rationalization of S. That is, for some t we have for all b qt
that there exists b qr such that Um (b qt) < Um (b qr) and Ul (b qt) ￿ Ul (b qr).
But then, for the given t, we have for all b qt that there exists b qr such that
￿1
trU1 (b qt) + ￿2
trU2 (b qt) < ￿1
trU1 (b qr) + ￿2
trU2 (b qr) for all ￿1
tr; ￿2
tr 2 R++; and
this implies a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1: (i) implies (ii). Suppose there exists a pair of collectively non-
satiated utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a collective rationalization
of S. This implies that for all t 2 f1;:::;Tg there exists a speci￿cation of
the feasible personalized quantities b qt such that Um (b qr) > Um (b qt) implies
Ul (b qr) < Ul (b qt) (m 6= l) for all b qr with p0
tqr ￿ p0
tqt.
For this speci￿cation of the feasible personalized quantities, we can specify
hypothetical relations Hm for all s 2 f1;:::;Tg and m 2 f1;2g as follows:
qsH
mqt , U
m(b qs) ￿ U
m(b qt): (1)
We next have to verify whether this speci￿cation of the hypothetical
relations satis￿es the rules (i)-(iv) in the CARP De￿nition 6. Note that we do
not distinguish between the relations Hm and Hm
0 because the speci￿cation
of the relation Hm is obtained by using real numbers. This also makes that
rule (ii) is automatically satis￿ed.
As for rule (i), a collective rationalization of the data requires that p0
sqs ￿
p0
sqt implies that for any b qs and b qt we have U1(b qs) ￿ U1(b qt) or U2(b qs) ￿
U2(b qt), which necessarily obtains qsH1qt or qsH2qt:
As for rule (iii), we make the distinction between t1 = t2 = t, which
implies r = ftg, and t1 6= t2, which implies r = ft1;t2g. We ￿rst consider
r = ftg, and we prove rule (iii) ad absurdum. Suppose p0
sqs ￿ p0
sqt in
combination with qtHmqs and not qsHlqt (with l 6= m). Given our speci￿-
cation of the hypothetical relations, this implies that Um(b qt) ￿ Um(b qs) and
Ul(b qs) < Ul(b qt): But then b qs is not Pareto e¢ cient, which con￿ icts with a
collective rationalization of the data:
22We use local collective non-satiation to obtain that rule (iii) is satis￿ed
for r = ft1;t2g. To see this, suppose rule (iii) does not hold, i.e. qt1Hmqs
and not qsHlqt2 (with l 6= m) for p0
sqs ￿ p0
s (qt1 + qt2). Note that qt1Hmqs
and not qsHlqt2 implies that Um(b qt1) ￿ Um(b qs) and Ul(b qs) < Ul(b qt2). Local
collective non-satiation implies that for any ￿ ￿ 0 there exist quantities q
with kqt1 + qt2 ￿ qk ￿ ￿ for which p0
sqs ￿ p0
sq and such that Um(b q) ￿
Um(b qt1) and Ul(b q) ￿ Ul(b qt2): But then, given the above, we also have that
Um(b q) ￿ Um(b qs) and Ul(b q) > Ul(b qs), and p0
sqs ￿ p0
sq; this means that b qs
is not Pareto e¢ cient, which con￿ icts with a collective rationalization of the
set S.
As for rule (iv), we again make the distinction between s1 = s2 = s,
which implies r = fsg, and s1 6= s2, which implies r = fs1;s2g. We ￿rst
consider r = fsg, and we prove rule (iv) ad absurdum. Suppose qs H1 qt
and qs H2 qt in combination with p0
tqt > p0
tqs. On the one hand, qs H1
qt and qs H2 qt implies U1(b qs) ￿ U1(b qt) and U2(b qs) ￿ U2(b qt). On the
other hand, because p0
tqt > p0
tqs, local collective non-satiation implies that
there exists q close enough to the quantities qs with p0
tqt > p0
tq so that
Um(b q) ￿ Um(b qs) and Ul(b q) ￿ Ul(b qs) with at least one strict inequality. But
then Um(b q) ￿ Um(b qt) and Ul(b q) ￿ Ul(b qt), with at least one strict inequality,
and p0
tqt > p0
tq; this means that b qt is not Pareto e¢ cient, which con￿ icts
with a collective rationalization of the set S:
We analogously prove that rule (iv) is satis￿ed for r = fs1;s2g. For s1 6=
s2; let qs1 H1 qt and qs2 H2 qt in combination with p0
tqt > p0
t (qs1 + qs2).
On the one hand, qs1 H1 qt and qs2 H2 qt implies U1(b qs1) ￿ U1(b qt) and
U2(b qs2) ￿ U2(b qt) . On the other hand, because p0
tqt > p0
t (qs1 + qs2), one
can analogously as in rule (iii) show that local collective non-satiation implies
that b qt is not Pareto e¢ cient, which con￿ icts with a collective rationalization
of the set S:
Step 2: (ii) implies (iii). We must show that, if the set S satis￿es CARP,





tr 2 R++ that meet the collective Afriat inequalities.
First, for the given speci￿cation of the relations Hm consistent with
CARP, we specify the numbers Um
t 2 R++ that satisfy for each qt1, qt2 :
if qt1H













Note that, if not qt1Hmqt2 and not qt2Hmqt1, then there is no restriction on
23the corresponding values of Um
t1 and Um
t2 . Generally, the speci￿c values of Um
t1
and Um
t2 are irrelevant for our following argument.
Given this, for each t;r1;r2 2 f1;:::;Tg, with r = fr1g [ fr2g, we must
specify numbers ￿1
tr, ￿2













t ] ￿ p0
t
￿P
r2r qr ￿ qt
￿
is met.
We distinguish two possible cases:
CASE 1: qr1H1qt and qr2H2qt: Given the speci￿cation of the numbers Um
t




t : Since qr1H1qt




￿qt) ￿ 0. For p0
t(
P
r2r qr ￿qt) > 0 the corresponding collective Afriat
inequality is satis￿ed by setting ￿1
tr and ￿2




r2r qr ￿ qt
￿
= 0 we note that qr1H1qt and qr2H2qt imply, respectively,





t because of (3), and the corresponding collective
Afriat inequality is satis￿ed for any ￿1
tr and ￿2
tr:
CASE 2: Not qr1H1qt or not qr2H2qt: Without losing generality, let us as-
sume that we have not qr1H1qt: Our speci￿cation in (2) and (3) then implies
that we exclude U1
r1 ￿ U1
t . So we can specify that U1
r1 < U1




r2r qr ￿qt), we then set ￿1
tr su¢ ciently large and ￿2
tr su¢ ciently




















corresponding collective Afriat inequality is met.
Step 3: (iii) implies (iv). Our proof contains two steps. We address data
rationalization in Step 3a, and continuity and monotonicity in Step 3b.
Step 3a: data rationalization. Suppose for all t;r1;r2 2 f1;:::;Tg, with




tr 2 R++ that meet
the collective Afriat inequalities. We have to prove that we can then specify
utility functions U1 and U2 such that for each observation t there exist feasible
personalized quantities b qt and, for all b qr with p0
tqr ￿ p0




1 (b qt) + ￿
2U
2 (b qt) ￿ ￿
1U
1 (b qr) + ￿
2U
2 (b qr):
To obtain the result, we de￿ne U1 (b qr) and U2 (b qr) such that
U



















2 (b qr) = U
2
t￿, (5)














t if qt ￿ qr for some t,
0 otherwise.
As a ￿rst step, we show that we have U1 (b qt) = U1
t and U2 (b qt) = U2
t for
each observed t. We prove ad absurdum. If the result does not hold, then





























































Now consider ￿1 = ￿1

















































which violates the collective Afriat inequalities.
Next, we show that our speci￿cation of U1 and U2 provides a collective
rationalization of the set S. Consider qr and p0
tqt ￿ p0
tqr for some observed
t. Then we must show that there exist ￿1; ￿2 2 R++ such that ￿1U1 (b qt)+
￿2U2 (b qt) ￿ ￿1U1 (b qr)+ ￿2U2 (b qr), with U1 (b qr) and U2 (b qr) de￿ned in (4)
and (5). We prove the result for ￿1 = ￿1
tft￿g and ￿2 = ￿2
tft￿g: First, because
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2
tft￿gU



















































is satis￿ed because s￿ solves the min problem in (4). We obtain that there
exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a collective rational-
ization of S:
Step 3b: monotonicity and continuity. Given the construction of U1 and
U2 in (4) and (5), we can always construct b q that obtains monotonicity
and continuity. Let us ￿rst consider monotonicity. For observed t1 and
t2, monotonicity means that b qt1 ￿ b qt2 and b qt1 6= b qt2 implies U1 (b qt1) ￿
U1 (b qt2) and U2 (b qt1) ￿ U2 (b qt2), with at least one strict inequality. This
condition is easily met for a given set S. For example, suppose that there are
2 goods e1; e2 2 f1;:::;Ng with strictly positive quantities for all observed
t, i.e. (qt)e1 > 0 and (qt)e2 > 0 for all t (with (x)e the e-th entry of the










em if Um (b qt1) >
Um (b qt2) (m = 1;2): (Empirically, the existence of e1 and e2 with (qt)e1 >
0 and (qt)e2 > 0 for all observed t is a very mild assumption. Formally
similar constructions are possible if this assumption is not met, but they are
mathematically less elegant.) Using (4) and (5), monotonicity in terms of
b qt and Um (b qt) for observed t implies monotonicity in terms of b qr with qr
observed or unobserved.
26Let us then consider continuity. If the functions U1 and U2 in (4) and (5)
have any discontinuities, their number will be ￿nite by construction, because
the number of observations T is ￿nite. As such, the discontinuities can be
￿ ￿xed￿by linear interpolation without interfering with the rationalization
argument in Step 3a.
Step 4: (iv) implies (i). This is trivial.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
The results follow from the construction of the proof of Theorem 2. Specif-
ically, the data rationalization argument (Step 3a) and the continuity argu-
ment (using linear interpolation; Step 3b) apply for general utility functions
U1 and U2 de￿ned in general b q: These arguments directly extend to the
special cases with utility functions V m de￿ned in qm (m = 1;2), for Propo-
sition 1, and utility functions W m de￿ned in qh (m = 1;2), for Proposition
2. Finally, the argument for monotonicity (Step 3b of the proof of Theo-
rem 2) directly extends to the case with utility functions V m de￿ned in qm
(m = 1;2), which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Example 1
This example illustrates that monotonicity of the individual utility func-
tions is testable when private consumption is excluded (i.e. all consump-
tion is public). As a preliminary remark, we recall that W m (qt) = Um
t for
observed t. We thus need a set S that satis￿es CARP only if qt2Hmqt1
(and not qt1Hmqt2) for qt1 ￿ qt2 and qt1 6= qt2: using (1), this corre-
sponds to W m (qt2) > W m (qt1) for qt1 ￿ qt2 and qt1 6= qt2, which vi-
olates monotonicity. We complete the argument by considering the set



























































27It can be veri￿ed that this set satis￿es CARP. However, for t = 1 or 3 we
necessarily obtain q4H1qt or q4H2qt, while qt ￿ q4 and qt 6= q4. We obtain
this last result in two steps:
Step 1: CARP consistency requires (for m 6= l and s;t 2 f1;2;3g)
q1 H
m
0 q2, q2 H
m
0 q3 and q3 H
l








The reasoning goes as follows. First, because for all s;t 2 f1;2;3g we have
p0
sqs > p0
sqt, rule (i) of De￿nition 6 implies qs H1
0 qt or qs H2
0 qt and rule
(iv) excludes qs H1
0 qt and qs H2
0 qt. Next, because p0
1q1 > p0
1 (q2 + q3),
rule (iv) of De￿nition 6 excludes q2 H1
0 q1 and q3 H2
0 q1 and, conversely, q2
H2
0 q1 and q3 H1
0 q1. Similarly, p0
3q3 > p0
3 (q1 + q2) excludes q2 H1
0 q3 and
q1 H2
0 q3 and, conversely, q2 H2
0 q3 and q1 H1
0 q3. We conclude that CARP
consistency requires (6) and (7).
Step 2: because p0
4q4 > p0
4q2, rule (i) of De￿nition 6 implies q4 H1
0 q2 or q4
H2
0 q2. Together with (6) and (7), this implies q4Hmq3 (and not q3Hmq4)
or q4Hlq1 (and not q1Hlq4), which gives the result.
We conclude that a data rationalization of the given set requires non-
monotone individual utility functions: for t = 1 or 3, we have W 1 (q4) >
W 1 (qt) or W 2 (q4) > W 2 (qt), while qt ￿ q4 and qt 6= q4.
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